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Julian 'Teicher* 
Australia has a lang experience of centralised wage-fiXing through the federal and state 
systems of conciliation and .arbitration. but unti/1975 this machinery was .not embetlded 
in a .more g.ener,al incomes policy. Although this was undermined progressively and 
finally abandoned in 1981. a further incomes policy was introduced two years ,later, 
following the e.lection of.afederal Labour government. Overseas .experiences .indicates that 
the structural features of the ,union movement are important det,erminants ofthe success of 
an incomes po.licy. Australian experience since 1983. how.ever, indicates that, despite 
large numbers of compe.ting unions and a union peak council lacking for.mal control over 
affiliates, an incomes policy may be viable. This reasoning was supported by empirical 
evidenc,e pertaining ,to the .role of the Australian Council of Trade Unions .in securing 
compliance from affiliated .wzions. 
Introduction 
Australia and New Zealand are usually given little attention in the incomes policy 
literature (Boston 1986, p.3). In the Australian case this is surprising, because the 
conciliation and arbitration systems constitute an institutional framework and processes 
conducive to the operation of an incomes policy (Phelps Bfown, 1978, pp.73-83). In the 
Australian incomes policy literature, a pessimistic prognosis has usually rested on the 
union movement's lack of cohesion and, in particular, the destabilising consequences of 
strategically placed groups of workers achieving wage settlements in excess of the 
centrally detennined noun (for example, Yerbury 1980, p.470 and Blandy and Creigh 
1983, p.160). 
The ensuing discussion challenges the pessimistic view; its main concern is with the 
capability and success of the Australian Council of T.rade Unions (ACIU) in secwing 
union compliance with the provisions of the Statement of Accord by the Australian 
• Department of Administrative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 
Australia, 3168. 
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Labour .Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions. lt is stressed that compliance 
with the incomes policy does not result only from enforcement by the ACIU, but also 
feflects an assessment by unions and unionists of the net benefits of the Accord and its 
associated processes. The discussion proceeds on the basis that, despite differences in the 
economic, social and political circumstances of Australia and New Zealand, in the 
industrial relations sphere the commonalities are such that the experiences of one country 
may be instructive for the other.. 
Background: :incomes policy developments 
Economi~c conditions were already declining in 1972, when a federal Labour 
gov,emment was elected for the frrst time in 23 years. Both unemployment and inflation 
were increasing; the "money wage explosion" of 1973-75 was perhaps the central feature 
of this period with average weekly earnings increasing at an average annual rate of 19.9 
percent and peaking at 28.4 percent, in 1974. Such was the deterioration that, in June 
1974, the federal government issued a call for wage restraint, although in the 1973 
national wage case it had argued that substantial wage increases could be awarded without 
inflationary consequences (Nieuwenhuysen 1986, p.70-1). 
The implementation of wage controls was constrained by the Constitution, however, 
which prohibits federal governments from dir~ectly setting wag~es and preserves separate 
industrial jurisdictions at federal and state levels. Consequently, wage restraint could not 
be secured without the assistance of the Commission and its state counterparts. In 
addition, the demise of the penal sanctions in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 
1969, following a campaign of union opposition, meant that the restoration of a 
cenualised wage-fixing system would require the co-operation of key unions and the 
ACTU. 
Despite continuing reservations as to the viability of a ~centralised wage-fixing system, 
the Commission concluded in April 1975 d1at there was sufficient consensus between the 
major economic interest groups to warrant the trial adoption of a system of prima facie 
full wage indexation,. The Co.mmission's decision was conditional on the implementation 
of "supporting mechanisms" by the federal government. These included continuing 
support for the operation of the Prices Justification Tribunal, upholding the indexation 
guidelines in areas of public employment outside the Commission's jurisdiction and 
ensuring federal government policies did not conflict with the operation of the wage-fixing 
system (Plow.man 1983, p.416}. Thus came into being Australia's first voluntary 
incomes policy. 
In November 1975, the federal government was removed from office by the Governor 
General and a conservative ~coalition was returned at the ensuing election. The incoming 
Liberal-National ~Country Party (L-NCP) governm~ent opposed wage indexation 
consistently and undennined the supporting mechanisms. Apparently influenced by the 
~ederal government, the Commission only rar~ely awarded full wage indexation and 
persisted with centralised wage-fixing, despite the government's hostility. In the 
circumstances, the state tribunals increasingly assened their independence of the wage-
fixing principles and collectiv~e negotiations become more common. Finally, in July 
1981, the Commission tenninated the wage indexation system as it became known. The 
trigg,er for its decision was a collectively bargained wage round and associated increased 
industrial disputation which led to real average weekly earnings rising at 3.2 percent in 
1980/81 (Rimmer 1987, pp.100-1). 
In the following months, the pattern of wage-fixing, in essence, became decenttalised, 
although this was qualified by the state tribunals continuing to award across the board 
wage increases (Rimmer 1987., pp.103-4). With the conclusion of an agreement in the 
pacesetting metal industry and its ratification by the Commission in December 1981, the 
wage round became more structured. Following the Metal Industry Agreement, money 
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wage increases of 17.6 percent w~ere rapidly transmitted through the economy, 
notwithstanding the adoption of a non-accommodating monetary poli~cy by the 
government. Confronted by rapidly rising real wages and increasing inflation and 
unemployment, the government responded pragmatically. In December 1982, a 12-month 
wages freeze was legislated for federal government employees and, with the co-operation of 
the tribunals and state governments, a 6-month wages freeze was applied to .most other 
~employees. Predictably, this provoked protest strikes, notably in the strategic oil and 
transport industries. Against this backdrop of increasing economic and industrial relations 
instability, the government called an early ~election. .At the polls a month later Labour 
was returned; an important element in its victory was the Accord or social contract with 
the unions. Although it was ratified by ACIU affiliates at a hastily-convened conference 
immediately prior to the election, it was ·more in the character of an agreem·ent negotiated 
between the Labour Party and the .ACIU over the preceding four years. 
The Accord was a detailed and wide-ranging document, although this discussion 
emphasises the wages provisions. It committed an incoming Labour government to 
supporting restoration of a centralised wage-.fixing system, regular indexation of award and 
overaward payments to maintain their real value and periodic wage adjustments to reflect 
labour's contribution to rising national productivity. In return for these and other 
commitments relating to prices, non-wage incomes, taxation, government expenditure and 
tripartite consultation on ·economic policy, the ACIU aocepted that "in a period of 
economic ~crisis as now applying", partial ·wag~e indexation ~could apply and, except in 
"special and exttaordinary circumstances", there would be no extra claims (Statement of 
Accord 1983, p.lO). 
A key feature of the Accord was that its provisions were not endorsed by any employer 
organisations. The :newly-elected Labour government attempted to rectify this by 
convening the National Economic Summit Conference. 'Tripartite support for its wages 
provisions was clearly required in order to convince the Commission to implement a 
centralised system. In this respect, the Summit was a success, securing an unprecedented 
tripartite endorsement of the logic, but not the details of an incomes policy (National 
Economic Summit 1983, p.8) .. 
Accordingly, in September 1983, the Commission endorsed the resumption of a 
centralised ·wage-:fuing system based on prima facie real wage n1aintenance at half-yearly 
intervals, deferred consideration of union claims for a wage adjustment based on national 
productivity movements and provided for additional increases in a limited number of 
exceptional cilcumstances. A novel feature of the principles ·was that the Commission 
attempted to intelnalise enforcement; receipt of increases was made conditional on all 
unions which were parties to an award undertaking not to pursue any extra claims, except 
in accordance with the principles. As explained below, individual responsibility was 
supplemented with an .ACIU commibnent that it would attempt to ensure that affiliates 
complied with the guidelines. In this way, the principles r~efl,ected the reality that, 
notwithstanding the quasi-judicial nature of the tribunals, the application of legal 
sanctions does not provide a sufficient basis for wag.e regulation. 
Table 1 presents data linking movements in the consumer price index with 
compensating wage .adjustments awarded by the ·Commission over the period ~ending in 
December 1986; at this time wage indexation ceased but ~centralised adjustments continued. 
The frrst national wage decision, in September 1983., awarded full ·wage indexation in 
relation to the firSt two quarters of the year. Without this gesture unions ·were unlikely to 
have given more than token adherence ·to the wage-fixing principles and, critically, the 
AC1U would not have jeopardised its credibility with affiliates by attempting to enforce 
compliance. . 
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Table 1: Movements .in the ~Consumer Price Index and National Wage Case Decisions, 
Aust~alia, 1983 - 1986 (percentage changes) 
Date 
1983 March 
June 
September 
December 
1984 March 
June 
September 
December 
1985 March 
June 
September 
December 
1986 March 
June 
September 
December 
Consumer Price Index 
2.2 
2.1 
1.6 
2.4 
-0.4 (1.2) 
0.2 (1.1) 
1.3 (1.3) 
1.4 (1.4) 
1.4 
2.4 
2.2 
2.0 
2.3 
I. 7 
2.6 
2 . 9 
National Wage Case 
lnCJrase Implementation 
4.3 6 October, 1983 
4.1 4 April, 1984 
2.6 
3.8 
2.3 
6 April, 1985 
4 November, 1985 
1 July, 1986 
System of full percentage 
wage indexation tenninated 
23 December 1986 
Note: Bracketed figllfes reFer 10 CPI adjusted to ex·clude t.he effect of hospital and medical 
charges being deleted from the regimen. 
Source: Kenyon (1986, p.137 and p.145), and ACAC (1986b, p. 57) . 
Unions and incomes pol.icies 
The success of incomes policies depends upon the co-operation of the major economic 
interest groups, especially unions. In exchange, the interest groups can secu~e a wide 
range of benefits, both tangible and intangible. A central detenninant of the viability of 
an incomes policy is the control which union confederations exert over their affiliates. 
Following H~eadey's ( 1970, p.412) pioneering study, this is often fottnulated in tenns of 
the degree of ,centralization of the labour movement. For the 13 countries examined, 
Headey derived a "rough index" of centralization by classifying union confederations in 
tenns of power to intervene in any of the stages of the collective bargaining process, 
percentage of strike funds controlled, and control over resources as measured by staff per 
thousand members and levels of affiliation fees. Despite reservations about its crudity, the 
index confirn1ed the importance of centralization in those countries where an incomes 
policy had operated for a period of at least 10 years (Headey 1970, pp.431-3). Also 
important to incomes policy viability in the period examined, 1947-69, was the election 
of governments sympathetic to the union movement and the occurt,ence of wage 
deteunination primarily at the national level, the latter being a prerequisite for effective 
union confederation intervention (H·eadey 1970, pp.416-23). 
Subsequent research has tended to ~consider incomes policy within the context of an 
ongoing debate over ~corporatism and the class interests which are served by such 
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arrangements. Overwhelmingly, this research has focused on the felationship between 
ttade unions and the state (Wright and Apple 1980, p.453 and Regini 1984, p.127) and 
consideration of the union-centred issues has been largely derivative. Nonetheless, 
important insights into the issue of union compliance have been gained. 
A central issue is to detennine how unions "create a passive willingness on the part of 
their members to follow union directives and decisions, this being a precondition for the 
union's inte1rnediary function" (Muller-Jentsch, 1985, p.23). Two groups of factors are 
identified, those based on the organisational structme and membership and the traditions 
and political orientations of the unions. 
In the first category are .restrictions placed on membership participation in the decision-
making process and the extent to which specific groups hav~e the opportunity to influence 
particular policies. Typically, command over resources and decision making tends to be 
centralised leaving members little scope to exert influence on important areas, particularly 
wages policy .. These tendencies are often partly concealed by separating decision-making 
and participative processes. Of greater importance for Muller-Jentsch (1985, p.24) is 
membership composition; the larger and more cohesive a specific group, the greater its 
capacity to obstruct the implementation of a policy regardless of its representation on 
decision making bodies. Quite simply, unions rely on unpaid officials and the small 
minority of activists to implement policies and not to underta.k~e activities in conflict with 
union policies. 
In the second category is competition among leadership factions ov~er ideological and 
policy issues and the influence exerted by the trnditions of the union. For ~example, a 
union which owes its past successes primarily to opportunistic militancy is ·more likely 
to resort to industrial action than one with a history dominated by orderly industrial 
relations processes. Likewise, a union with a history of "going into battle" for specific 
interests within a heterogeneous membership is predicted to continue in that fashion. 
Also, the existence and nature of a union's political affiliations will influence its 
willingness to support the policies of the party in govem·ment (Muller-Jentsch, 1985, 
p . 25-6}. Presumably, that willingness will also be in.fluenced by the organisational and 
membership structure of the union., but, in Muller-Jentsch's exposition, politico-
traditional factors appear to exert an independent force, fiegardless of the organisational 
structure and decision making processes of the union. 
Goldthorpe (1984., p.326) is seemingly more ~confident of the prospects for 
harmonising sectional and broader union movement or working class interests. Emphasis 
is placed on the ~ific benefits of an incomes policy in securing compliance rather than 
the structural features of the union mov~ement. Using the examples of Austria, Sweden 
and Norway., Goldthorpe suggests stable corporatist bargaining usually is associated with 
union movement centralization and union leaders advocating a class position on political 
and economic issues and seeking to suppress "interests of a more sectional and shorter-
telntkind" (Goldthorpe 1984, p.329). 
Closely allied to Goldthorpe's view is a line of fieasoning associated with writers such 
as Olson (1982), I .ange (1984) and Scharpf (1984). They reject the argument that 
incomes policy will be undeunined by the free-riding behaviour of rational individuals, 
instead positing that: 
If union organisation is concentrated with a limited number of 
"encompassing" industrial unions, and if collective bargaining is centralized 
at the national level, the unions will tend to consider the macroeconomic 
consequences of wage settlements out of rational self-interest (Scharpf 1984, 
p.275). 
• 
A related issue is the purported linkage between incomes policies, a low and declining 
incidence of strikes and superior economic performance. It suggests unions, but not 
necessarily their members, may have traded off disputation and wage incr~eases for other 
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desired outcomes, like reduced unemployment. A comprehensive examination of this 
linkage has been undertaken by Cameron (1984) and Schott (1984 and 1985).. Over the 
peri.od 1965-82, of 17 advanced capitalist nations, only in Japan, Austria, Norway and 
Sweden were increases in unemployment less than one percent and only in Japan, 
Austria, Geranany, Switzerland and the Netherlands was the average annual rate of prices 
increase less than 3 percent. Working days lost through industrial disputes also were 
strongly cot related with the rate of change of nominal earnings and unemployment rates 
(Cameron 1984., pp.154-6). On the basis of this and other infoaanation, it was concluded 
that: 
the simultaneous occurrence of price stability and full employment in some 
nations, and inflation and unemployment in others, reflects a romplex causal 
~ ~ 
relationship between the two, in which the relative quiescence or economic 
militancy of labour plays a critical intermediary role (Cameron 1984, p.157). 
Further investigation revealed (1984, p.161) that low levels of strike activity and 
superior economic outcomes were achieved by countries with frequent leftist governments, 
but the significance of this was attenuated by the existence of a series of notable 
exceptions. Hence, Britain and Denmark had higher unemployment rates than expected, 
while unemployment rates in Japan and Switzerland were low despite the absence of leftist 
governments. 'This prompted an investigation of whether the frequency of leftist 
governments was a surrogate for the power of organised labour. For that purpose, an 
index of union movement power was derived from the union density, number of union 
confederations and incidence of union affiliation, capacity of the union confederation to 
intervene in any of the stages of collective bargaining, scope of collective bargaining and 
the existence of employee participation schemes (Cameron 1984, pp.l64-5). The 
resultant correlation between the organisational power of the union movement and leftist 
control of government was r=+.79, suggesting that the viability of incomes policy is 
connected with the organisational structure of the union movement (Cameron 1984, 
p.l68) - a finding remarkably similar to that of Headey (1970) and Schmitter (1981, in 
Cameron 1984, p.l68). These results, however, are of liule assistance in explaining the 
exceptional cases, particularly labour quiescence in Geunany, Japan and Switz,erland 
despite their low scores for union movement power. Another apparent paradox is the 
decline in .industrial militancy following the institution of corporatist arrangements in 
Britain and Italy in the early 1970's. 
Of the weak corporatist nations, Britain and Italy are cases in which incomes policies 
have been attempted for limited periods. These experiences were instructive in two ways. 
First, they illustrate that viable incomes policies may be established, despite the absence 
of the structural and institutional conditions usually viewed as a sufficient for such 
arrangements. Hence, Ita.ly provides a demonstration of the ways in which unions can 
avoid crises of representation. The absence of a single encompassing union confederation 
was accommodated by a "unitary pact" to avoid competition. Competition fro·m 
autonomous unions was minimised by "using their political resources to force Parliament 
and government to grant them some degree of privileged recognition" and by launching an 
ideological offensive attacking the autonomous unions fior their pursuit of sectional self 
interest. Union leaders participated in plant level negotiations, thereby limiting the scope 
for workers councils to articulate rank and flle dissent (Regini 1984, pp.l33-4). 
Second, the essential condition for unions embracing an incomes policy is a 
widespread view among unionists that the net benefits are positive, so the eventual failure 
of an incomes policy may be attributable not to the absence of the structural and 
institutional conditions discussed above, but to non-realisation of the expected ratio of 
benefits to costs (Regini 1984, p.l33). In both Britain and Italy, in the early 1970's, the 
net benefits of incomes policy appeared positive, but in the fo1 aner case they changed and 
in the latter, could not be realised. 
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Conversely, it is evident that the structural features of the union movement are no 
guarantee of the viability of an incomes policy. This point has been amply demonstrated 
by Fulcher (1987) in relation to the development of corporatist arrangements in Sweden. 
He concludes: 
the key to understanding the radicalism of 1970s Sweden is the idea of the 
contradictions of corporatism. 'The basic problem of corporatism is that it is 
an attempt to control powerful organisations through ~cooperation .... Control 
through cooperation is difficult either because control is subverted by the 
interest organisation. which seeks to bend policies in its favour, or because, 
if control is successful, the leadership of the organisation becomes alienated 
from its base (Fulcher 1987, p.248). 
Hence, it was not until the 1960s that wages policy became the vehicle ~or income 
redistribution toward the lower paid and was accorded priority over wage restraint. 
Likewise, until the Codetennination Law of 1976, the leadership of the Swedish Trade 
Unions Confederation (LO) opposed legislating for industrial democracy and, since 1906, 
had accepted employers' rights to hire and fire (Fulcher 1987, pp.241-6). In contrast to 
Higgins (1985), it is argued that the economic and social refonns of this period were 
forced upon the LO by an upsurge in rank and file militancy. The employers' response 
was unexpectedly militant: centtalised wage negotiations became increasingly prolonged, 
employers reverted to using large scale lockouts and the Employers Federation (SAF) 
embarked on major propaganda campaigns against the government's re~onn legislation 
(Fulcher 1987, p.245). 
Finally, a neglected aspect of the corporatist debates are the scattered observations, for 
example Lehmbruch (1'984, p.67) and Schott (1985, p.l7), which suggest that the 
character of workplace industrial relations is an important determinant of industrial 
disputation regardless of the existence of a national level corpotatist arrangements. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised that developed plant and enterprise level concertation is a 
major contributor to the superior economic perfounance of Gennany, Japan and Auslria, 
while the converse situation may help explain the economic malaise of countries like Italy 
and Britain. While consultative and participative bodies which are independent of unions, 
for example Works Councils, are best suited to workplace ~concertation, an accommodation 
can be reached with union negotiating bodies (Muiler-Jentsch 1985, pp.7-9). Co-operative 
relations with the workforce can be fostered by the development of internal labour markets 
which gives the ~core workforce vested int~ests, like job security and promotions. 
It is now possible to state the pre-conditions for union compliance with an incomes 
policy mo~e broadly than in terans of the structural features of the union movemenl 
These conditions can be summarised as follows: 
1. Unions will agree to support incomes policies where, for whatever reason, the 
anticipated net benefits are superior or more assured than directly negotiating with 
~employers. Relevant considerations could include the risks of fully utilising union 
bargaining power in a situation of economic crisis, organisational weakness of 
unions or the presence of a politically sympathetic government willing to make 
concessions 10 unions and unionists. 
2. Depending on the character of the particular national union movement, it will be 
necessary to combat the de-stabilising influence on incomes policy of sectional 
interests. This will be facilitated where the organisational structure of the union 
movement and the level of negotiations are more highly centralised. 
3.. Where for any reason the expected ratio of costs and benefits shifts unfavourably for 
labour, unions will confront an incipient crisis of representation. The significance 
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of that threat depends on the organisational resources available to individual unions 
and the pervasiveness of sectional, as opposed to class, allegiances among their 
members. 
4. Enterprise and plant level industrial relations arrangements may depress levels of 
industrial disputation independently of the existence or operation of an incomes 
policy, as appears to be the case in both Austria and Japan. 
Tbe ACTU and ·incomes policy 
A central issue for Australian incomes policy is the ACTU's capacity to secure union 
compliance. Thus, .in establishing the new wage-fixing system, in 1983, the Commission 
supplemented the "no ·extra claims" undertaking of individual unions with an 
unprecedented ACTU undertaking to exercise "collective responsibility" for the industrial 
conduct of affiliates (ACAC 1983, pp.17 -19). While the ACTU undertook to use all the 
resources at its disposal in an attempt to secure union compliance, feliance on enforcement 
is not the only factor in compliance. As is evident from the discussion, in the preceding 
section, union support for an incomes policy ~ests also on an assessment of the costs and 
benefits. 
'There has been c-ansiderabl~e pessimism in the industrial ~elations literature as to the 
ACTU's capacity to secure union compliance. Thus, Dabscheck (1977, p .. 399), drawing 
upon H·eadey (1970), argues that the only factor explaining the A·CTU's authority was its 
involvement in centralised wage-fixing, but even the operation of this factor is qualified. 
The AC1Us apparent success in restraining union wage demands after 1975 is attributed 
to a strategic decision that, in the depressed economic conditions, wage indexation would 
enable unions to secure higher wage levels than otherwise (Dabscheck 1977, p.398). 
Mofe generally Dabscheck (1977, p.399) concludes: 
Compulsory arbitration has developed calculative unions, a type of unionism 
which is prepared to instrumentally make use of "outside" or "external" bodies 
if this will enhance their prospects of realising their goals. The A~CTU is 
such an .. outside" body, but a body which has been ·created by the trade unions 
themselves . 
This issue is taken up by Wooden (1985) in relation to the Accord. His broad 
conclusion that the dominance of "narrow interest ~coalitions" precludes viable ongoing 
corporatist arrangements rests on four groups of conditions not being met: cultural 
homogeneity of the population., openness of the economy, absence of competition 
between parties internal to the major economic interest groups and a high degree of 
centralization of such groups. Interestingly, Wooden's exposition concentrates on the 
union dimensions of the last-mentioned factor (Wooden 1985, pp.18-23) and is derived 
~explicitly from H~eadey (1970) as updated and extended to Australia. Of the four 
constituents of Headey's index of union centralization., it is stated that "the only area in 
which the ACTU has been accorded any large measure of influence has been in the area of 
wage bargaining and certainly one objective of The [sic] Accord is to increase this degree 
of influence" (Wooden 1985, p.20). 
Wooden's argument is supported by international comparisons indicating the A,CTU,s 
lack of control over union strike funds, the low level of affiliation ~ees remitted by unions 
and a fragmented union structure. Particular emphasis is on the organisational structure of 
Australian unions with large numbers of predominantly occupational unions. 
Competition between unions within a given workplace is said to ensure competition to 
preserve relativities and these claims will eventually radiate throughout the employed 
workforce (Wooden 1985, p.20). It is argued also that typically the "s~ong consensus" · 
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~countries have small numbers of unions affiliated to a dominant union confederation, and, 
in Australia, the absence of that condition produces factionalism which is reflected in 
struggles over the composition of the ACTU Executive and the low level of funding 
approved by affiliates (Wooden 1985, p.20). Similar arguments have been advanced by 
others such as Dunkley (l984, p.381, and Dawkins and Blandy 1985, p.45). 
In contrast to the views articulated by Wooden (1985, p.23) and others, it is argued 
below that the ACTU's capabilities have been underestimated and its changing character 
has not been considered. Further, Wooden's argument is derived apparently from an 
incorrect interpretation of Headey (1970) and is influenced excessively by the problem of 
free-riding behaviour. This leads him to overlook that ~compliance is not simply a 
function of the structural ~eatures of the union movement but turns also on an assessment 
of the net benefits of an incomes policy. 
Dealing with the latter points first, Headey (1978, p.432) advanced centralization 
scores only as a "rough index~'. Especially important is the associated finding that, 
historically, affiliates tend to vest union confederations with authority to conduct incomes 
policy in times of economic crisis and over time "the continued ex~ercise of this power is 
inv~ested with a degree of legitimacy" (Headey 1970, p,.412-4). In the ACTU•s case, its 
involvement in ~centralised wage-fixing dates from the depression of the 1930's and, most 
recently, its legitimacy has been rein~orced by the economic crises of the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s (Teicher 1987, pp . 5-18). Further, refonnulating Headey's influence over 
collective bargaining indicator in tenns of influence over the wage deteunination process, 
as was done by Dabschec'k (1977, p.399), the low sco~e assigned to the A~cru by W~ooden 
(1985, p.25) must be increased even before accounting for the influence of the social 
contract. Moreover, Wooden, like Headey, fails to assign weights to the various 
indicators and it reasonably could be argued that influence over wage detenuination 
overshadows all others in its importance. 
Moving to a consideration of net benefits, union endorsement of the Accord at a 
Special Unions Conference in February 1983 was clearly influenced by the fact that it 
committed a Labour government to support a centralised wage-fixing system based upon 
full indexation. As in 1975, in the prevailing severely depressed economic conditions, a 
centralised system offered the pro~t of more certain and more unifo1n1 wage increases 
than could be obtained otherwise. Also important in the near-unanimous union 
endorsement of the Accord was a desire to assist in the defeat of the Liberal-National 
Country Party (L-NCP) government, rather than support for its specific contents 
(Borgmann 1984~ p.91). Likewise, acceptance of substantial modifications to the wages 
provisions at Special Unions Conferenc~es, in 1985 and 1987, was influenced by concern 
r-egarding the laissez-faire policies if an L-NCP government was ~elected (Davis 1985, 
pp . 595-6). 
The position of the Amalgamated Metal 'Y-'orkers Union (AMWU) is of particular 
importance in securing union endorsement of the Accord and for its continuing ·viability. 
Over the period 1974-83, there were massive job losses in manufacturing, and this 
accelerated dramatically after the conclusion of the Metal Industry Agreement; for example, 
in the metals and engineering industries net losses amounted to 152,000 jobs (Stilwell 
1986, p.97).. Equally, the negotiation of the metal industry agreement underscored the 
AMWU's strategic significance and that its support was necessary in any successful social 
contract (Ewer, Higgins and Stevens 1987, p.98). Beginning in 1982, the AMWU 
response to the malaise in ·manufacturing was to substitute its longstanding stra~egy of 
shop-floor militancy and decentnilised over-award bargaining with advocacy of a Swedish-
style social contract with the Labour Party (Stilwell 1986, pp. 27., 96-7). A 
manifestation of the .AMWUs significance was the incorporation of industry policy into 
the fmal draft of the Accord (Ewer, Higgins and Stevens 1'987, pp . 98-9). · By 'industry 
policy' it was meant that the ,government would adopt interventionist policies to .establish 
a div~ersified and internationally competitive manufacturing sector. In view of the 
AMWU's size (with 120,000 members it is the largest manufacturing union and one of 
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only ten unions with more than 80,000 members) and its history of opposition to co-
optio!l by the state, this change would have been important directly in eliminating a major 
source of destabilisation and providing an exemplar for union compliance. 
·various more tangible benefits were for:eshadowed in the Accord and, in the first 
eighteen months of the Labour government, wage reslraint was rewarded with substantial 
gains across a range of areas. The major initiatives were tax reductions for low and middle 
income earners; increased expenditure and honouring of specific commitments on 
education~ equal employment opportunity, job creation, health, housing, industry 
development, occupational health and safety and social security.; extensive consultation 
thfough the establishment of the Economic Planning and Advisory Council, Advisory 
Committee on Prices and lnoom,es, the Australian Manufacturing Council and its sectoral 
constituents; and the ,establishment of the Prices Surveillance Authority. Rimmer (1987, 
pp.ll3-4) particularly emphasises the importance of the Prices Surveillance Authority, the 
extension of controls over non-wage incomes and the extensive network of consultative 
mechanisms. Unions as organisations benefited directly by legislative amendments 
facilitating union mergers, simplifying of financial accounting and reporting requirements 
and abolition of the Industrial Relations Bureau {ACTU 1984, Advisory Committee on 
Prices and Incomes 1984 and Stilw~ell 1986). The symbolic significance of the latter 
measure was considerable, because most unions regarded the Industrial Relations Bureau as 
the centrepiece of the conservative government's assault on unions. 
Although the incentives for compliance are important, the capacity for enforcement is 
fundamental to Australian incomes policies. The focus in the ensuing paragraphs is on 
the ACTUs capacity for securing compliance, recognising the historically fragmented 
nature of Australian unionism. Specific changes considered are the ACTU's increased 
financial resources, reduced factional tensions, greater inclusiveness, growing recognition 
by the Commission of the ACTU's role in dispute settlement and wage dete1 ani nation and 
current pervasive political links. Taken together, factors both internal and external to the 
ACTU have combined to vest it with an unprecedented authority, albeit informal. 
Regarding financial resom:ces~ the 62 cents per member affiliation fee collected by the 
ACTU in 1982 has been compared unfavourably with the 1.5 percent of gross wages 
collected by its Austrian equivalent and the low l ~evel of affiliation fees approved at 
Congress has been attributed to factionalism {Wooden 1985, pp.20-1). Placing this in the 
context of incomes policy, Wooden (1985, p.20) asserts that lack of fesources "operates as 
a major restraint on the ability of the ACTU to both sell to its affiliates the need to co-
operate" and to monitor the extent of their compliance. A similar point has been made 
also by Dabscheck (1983, p.404), that the ACTU officials have "been starved of funds and 
personnel, and as a result, have lacked the whefewithal if they ever had the desire to 
dominate affiliates". 
While acknowledging the comparative resource deficiencies of the ACTU, Wooden 
does not consider the ends to which resourc~es are directed and overlooks that, in recent 
years, there has been a significant and sustained increase in resources available to the 
ACTU. The latter change can be traced back to the 1979 Congress at which a cross-
factional agfeement resulted in the defeat of a pfoposal to lin affiliation fees from 25 ~cents 
per adult member to 75 cents, with a figme of 40 cents being agr~eed. In February 1980, a 
further compfomise saw this inc~ease to 60 ~cents. Congress agreed to raise affiliation 
fees to 80 cents in 1983 and further real increases, in 1985 and 1987., were not contested. 
Increased tunding has been paralleled in ,ACTU staff levels, from 15 positions in 1981 to 
41 in 1983 and 46 in 1'985. As an index of the improvement in the A,CTU's ability to 
communicate with affiliates and monitor Lheir activities these increases were significant 
The increase in resources identified above is a major consequence of the lessening of 
factional tensions. In tum, this has increased the ACTU's credibility in l.he political and 
industrial arenas and has enhanced its perceived authority in dealing with affiliates also. 
Given that at least 79 pe11cent of union members belong to the 162 unions affiliated to the 
ACTU, and that these include all 33 unions with more than 30,000 members (ACTU 
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1987, p.ll), almost any union which attempts to contravene the incomes policy 
effectively can be isolated from fraternal support. Further, while Wooden (1985, p.20) 
concedes that only a few key affiliates, like the now-deregistered Builders Labourers 
Federation (BLF), have sufficient bargaining power to be immune to this sanction, their 
non-compliance and consequential widespread wages flow-ons are regaJided as inevitable .. 
As will be seen below, the predicted scenario did not unfold. 
Evidence of greater unity of pwpose is found in the conduct of the recent biennial 
Congresses and Special Unions Conferences and in the elections for the Executive. This 
has been most marked since the election of the Labour government in 1983; at the 1985 
Congress, for example, the wages policy motion endorsing the Accord was moved on a 
cross-factional basis. More significantly. many resolutions were passed unanimously and 
a vote count w,as not required on any issue, a phenomenon not wiUlessed since 1939 
(Martin 1985, p.102). Similarly, in the Executive elections, in 1985, a ballot was not 
required for 15 of the 18 industry ~oup positions on the expanded Executive, and for the 3 
vice-presidential positions a ballot was held only to determine which of the candidates 
would become senior vice-president. The diminution of factional tensions was aided by 
increasing the size of the Executive by 5, to 31, as was evidenced in the associated 
restructure of the industry group positions when, unpreceden~edly, no affiliate opposed the 
proposed composition. Consequently, the Executive became large enough to pfovide a 
seat for most major ACIU affiliates and, as with its predecessor, the political factions had 
approximately equal representation. This tends to vest Executive decisions with an 
authority which is founally absent in the ACIU Constitution in which the only sanction 
is disaffiliation. 
Also important is the ACIUs increased inclusiveness, a dev,elopment facilitated by the 
transition from the 30-year incumbency of ACIU President Albert Monk to a younger 
generation of leaders notable for their pragmatism and dynamism. The first of this 
generation of professionals was Bob Hawke (now Prime Minister) who was elected 
President in 1969. The hallmark of the Hawke presidency was to place the ACIU on the 
consensus-seeking path (Rawson 1982, p.116) which characterises its present leadership. 
This is reflected in the conduct of Congress and the composition of the Executive 
di~ussed above. 
The ACIU's inclusiveness is manifest both in the proportion of unionists belonging 
10 affiliates and in their changed occupational composition. Hence, in 1961, the AC1U 
• 
covered only 65 percent of unionists whereas present estimates range between 79 and 90 
percent (ACIU 1987, p.l1, Davis 1985, p.595). Much of this growth has been recent 
and has filled the major gaps in its occupational coverage, particularly among white-collar 
employees, which Martin (1968, p.150) had previously noted. Especially important were 
the mergers of rival confederations with the ACIU. 'The Australian Council of Salaried 
and Professional Associations (ACSPA), which cov,ered some 163,000 unionists, merged 
in 1979. This was followed by the 132,000-member Council of Australian Gov,emment 
Employee Organisations (CAGEO) in 1981 and by the '95,000-member Australian Public 
Service Federation in 1985. The significance of this is qualified, as a number of the 
ASCP A unions were dual affiliates and some major white collar unions, notably the 
Association of Drafting, Surveying and Technical Employees had switched their 
allegiances 10 the ACIU rather than await the merger (Griffin and Giuca. 1986, p.487). 
The end result of this process is that few influential unions remain outside the ACIU and 
it stands unrivalled by any equivalent organisation of employers. This vests it with 
considerable authority in dealing with individual affiliates, as censure by the ACIU 
potentially entails losing the moral and material support of all but the smallest unions. 
Indeed, the recent unsuccessful attempts by the Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union 
(PGEU) to circumvent the wage-fixing principles and resist employer invocation of 
various legal sanctions suggests that the tenn collective solidarity has acquired a new 
• 
mearung. 
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Central to the ACTU's metamorphosis is its symbiotic relationship with the 
~commission, and this is evidenced in the latter's occasional departures from a strict 
• 
interpretation of the wage-fixing principles largely to meet the needs of the ACIU. ~on 
one occasion, the Commission allowed an over-award claim to be processed as an anomaly 
(ACAC 1984a, pp.16-18), and on another, it varied the principles outside of the scheduled 
Jreview (ACAC 1985b, pp.l5-16). The Commission's growing recognition of the 
strategic significance of the AC1U stems partly from its influence over affiliates and 
operates to reinforce that influence. The substantial bases of this influence aJie the 
ACTU's frequent int~ervention in disputes with a high public profile or adverse 
consequences for other affiliates, co-ordination of award negotiations in key areas, such as 
the oil industry, and conduct of national test cases, particularly in relation to wages and 
shorter working hours. 
The ACIU has a history of involvement in industrial disputes and this has sometimes 
been decisiv~e. In the immediate post-war period, its interv~entions in disputes involving 
the militant left-wing Seamen's Union of Australia, Miners Federation and the Waterside 
Workers Federation (Hagan 1981, pp.232-44 and Martin 1968, pp.153-4) were especially 
notable. This is buttressed by the fact that, since its inception, the ACIU has been the 
principal union representative in the basic wage and margins cases (pre-1967) and the 
national wage cases (post-1967) in which the Commission has articulated wages policy. 
Only occasionally have unions been represented separately, other than by ACSPA or 
CAG.EO. It also has been argued (Plowman 1983, p . 415) that the A~CIU's pivotal role 
has been assured by the Commission's experiences in the 1960s, specifically, the growth 
of over-award bargaining and the abandonment of penal sanctions atter a union campaign 
of opposition. For the first time, there was a very real threat that large numbers of unions 
would desert the arbitral system in favour of direct bargaining and the Commission's 
authority in industrial relations was severely diminished by the political realities of 
enforcement. Rimmer (1987, p.89) has emphasised also the influence of "eccentric wage 
decisions" by the Commission in the post-war period and the increased "independent 
strength of employers and unions". 
Finally, the importance of political links cannot be overestimated; their ~effective use 
demonstrates the value of ACTU affiliation to pragmatic and politically uncommitted 
unionists. Without them, arguably, the ACIU would have been much less successful in 
securing the affiliation of white collar unions (Rawson 1978, p. 77). 
The .ACIU's fot1nal links with the .Labour Party ar~e of quite recent origin (Martin 
1968., p.150). As the~e had been no federal Labour government during most of 'the post-
war period, the ACIU relied on strong but infotnaal links, such as the overlap and 
exchange of personnel with the Labour Party. Surprisingly, this did not change when 
Labour held offic-e in the period 1972-75; informal links, like Hawke's presidency of both 
the Labour Party and ACTU .and Labour Minister Cameron's many contacts in unions, 
wefe utilised almost exclusively (Rawson 1982, p.lll ). By contrast, during the ensuing 
conservative govemmen~ 1975-83, a programme of legislation aimed at impeding union 
functioning (see Mitchell 1978 and MacCallum 1980 especialJy) and repeated attempts to 
reduce the value of various components of the social wag~e pfopelled the ACIU into a 
leadership role in which fonnallinks played a decisive role. Rawson (1982, p.113) argues 
·this was a major source of the ACTirs growth over the period 1975-83, during which the 
ACfU gained most of the major white-collar affiliates. 
The election of a Labour Government in 1983 brought extensive use of both types of 
links. It is doubtless significant that the Prime Minister was previously the ACIU 
President and the Minister for Industrial Relations, Ralph Willis, had been its Industrial 
Advocate and that relations between the leaders wer~e cemented during the prolonged 
negotiation of the Accord. More concretely, a rang.e of ~consultative structures was 
~established pursuant to the Accord. The capacity of the ACIU to intervene on behalf of 
affiliates is recognised by unions and as such is a source of influence over them. 
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Although Australia has a large number of sometimes competing unions, this does not 
necessarily preclude the operation of a viable incomes policy. Focusing on the nature of 
the ACfU and changes in its character, by 1983 the Acru was poised to play a strategic 
role in implementing the incomes policy. It would be naive to conclude that the AC1Us 
influence over affiliates will not wane over time; the failure to achieve a sustained 
economic recovery or, conversely, a rapid expansion of employment could shatter the 
fragile internal consensus among ACI1J affiliates resulting ultimately in the demise of the 
incomes policy and the associated consultative sttuctures. It would be equally naive to 
ascribe ·the ACI1J's influence over affiliates solely to economic conditions. Nevertheless, 
if economic or political factors undea naine the conditions for a continuing incomes policy, 
the experience of 1975-81 suggests the ACI1J leaders will respond to the mood of its 
affiliates and withdraw their support. 
The ACTU and union compliance 
Apart from some inconclusive evidence of wages drift I ., there is little to suggest that 
non-compliance was a problem during the first three years of the social contract. 
Alongside falling direct and indirect labour costs, the operntion of the Accord was 
characterised by an exceptional decline in indusbial disputation2, particularly over wages 
issues. It remains however to clarify the ACI1J's ~ole in this shift. 
The role of the A~cru is not confined to en~orcing the wage-fixing principles on 
recalcitrant unions; its influence with the federal government and the Commission is used 
also to obtain ~concessions which might not be available to unions operating in isolation. 
This combination of penalties and rewards has not always been effective; however., only a 
small number of unions have succeeded in circumv~entin,g the principles, and this has not 
led to widespread non-compliance., despite the ·existence of divergent interests within and 
between unions. 
Along with the Builders Labour~ers Federation, the 11 ,000-.member Food Preservers 
Union (FPU) was one of few unions which repeatedly challenged the incomes policy. The 
thr·ee best known disputes involved the imposition of work bans on the H.J. Heinz 
Company, Plumrose (Australia) Limited and Rosella-Lipton Proprietary Limited. 
The Heinz dispute was particularly hard-fought, lasting eleven weeks and involving 
:stand-downs of employees who refused to work "as directed", and eventually the wage 
demands were conceded. During ·the dispute, the Commission repeatedly sought .ACI1J 
intervention to have the bans lifted. The ACTU's failure was reflected in part in the 
pessimistic note sounded by the ~Commission in its decision introducing the centralised 
system: 
Notwithstanding the commitmen·t given by the ACTU for 'the future we 
~express our ,great ooncem at the industrial actions proceeding currently to 
~obtain sectional claims ... which may unsettle relativities and generate flow-
ons inconsistent with the principles about to ·oome into operation (ACAC 
1983, p.l8). 
The Heinz dispute was followed closely by a dispute with Nestles over its refusal to 
grant claims, including a flow-on of the 4.3 percent national wage decision and a 16 dollar 
catch-up. There the ACIU achieved a settlement, persuading the union to drop the catch-
up claim and accept a working party examination of rosters (Workforce 1983b, p.l) . 
1 
2 
• 
Business Council of Australia. 1985/6, 1987; Treasury 198.5, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) 198Sa 
Beggs and Chapman, 1986; ABS 1986(b) 
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In September 1984, the FPU finally undertook to abide by the principles. The timing 
is consistent with the union recognising that the negative CPI figure in the fiiSt two 
quarters of 1984 precluded the prospect of further wage rise before an expected national 
wage decision in March 1985 (see table 1). A ~commiunent to the principles, however, 
ensured FPU members a flow-on of the 4.1 percent awarded in April 1984. Also 
important in this changed attitude were clear indications that the union had little support 
from the ACfU or other affiliates. This ·was not the end of FPU challenges to the 
principles, but it appears that subsequent disputes lacked official union backing and did not 
represent a deliberate challeng~e to the principles. 
The Builders Labourers Federation is almost certainly the only union which, having 
undertaken to abide by the principles, proceeded systematically and repeatedly to br~each 
them. The BLFs ~conduct eventually resulted in an extraordinary scenario in view of 
Labour's past opposition to the use of penalties in industrial relations. The federal 
government enacted ~ial legislation which, via an extensive inquiry undertaken by the 
Commission, led to its deregistration pursuant to the legislation. Complementary action 
was taken by the governments of New South Wales and Victoria in relation to the BLFs 
state-·registered counterparts. Further federal legislation resulted in its membership being 
allocated to other unions in the industry and, with the tacit consent of the ACTU, they 
willingly recruited the fot aner BLF m~embers. 
In early 1983, the ACTU and the government intervened successfully to halt 
disputation occurring in relation to negotiations over a building industry agreement. The 
outcome was a moratorium on industrial action over the union claims, the commencement 
of detailed negotiations under the auspices of the ACfU and federal government agreement 
to withdraw from defegistration proceedings against the BLF which were initiated by its 
predecessor. In the subsequent Federal Court proceedings, the government relied heavily 
on an ACTU Executiv~e resolution that it would take all reasonable steps to secure the 
union's compliance with its undertakings to adhere to the te1nts of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act (ACAC 1984b, pp.22-4 ). In itself, this was a potent demonstration of the 
ACTU's influence and could be expected to have reinforced its control over affiliates. 
However, during 1983 and 1984, the BLF rejected any lasting commitment to the 
principles. Despite the best efforts of the ACTU, undertakings by the BLF were 
repeatedly broken by industrial action which at one stage jeopafdised the national wage 
indexation adjustment. The Commission found that the BLF had deliberately and 
repeatedly breached the principles., but rather than penalise all unions parties to the award, 
it did not withhold the indexation adjusunent In its decision, the Commission clearly 
attests the importance of the ACTU: 
We place particular stress on the role of the ACTU. That body has played a 
responsible part in co-ordinating the negotiations and is endeavouring to 
eliminate industrial action associated with the superannuation claim (ACA·C 
l984b, p.l7). 
During the course of 1985, the ACTU .made numerous well-publicised but 
unsuccessful attempts to have the BLF adhere to its various undertakings, including that 
to adhefe to the principles. By August, with the federal government seemingly committed 
to pursuing the BLF's defegistration, the ACfU abandoned its efforts to influence the 
union's conduct or to dissuade the government from its chosen course. This was the only 
significant case in which the ACfU failed, however, the absence of union and ACfU 
support for the BLF was a significant departure from the union movement's traditional 
implacable opposition to the use of deregistration. Implicitly., this serves to demonstrate 
to other unions the dangers of falling foul of the ACIU. 
~Other unions breached the principles, but more sporadically. In those instances, 
ACfU influence was often strategic, either in securing union compliance or by isolating 
the miscreant from vital fraternal support. In the case of the Federated Furnishing Trades 
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Society (FFI'S), a three-week strike yielded a "disability" allowance for two hundred 
members employed by an aluminium window manufacturer. This settlement, with 
potential for uncontroUed flow-ons throughout the metal and building industries, Jeceived 
widespfead publicity with both the ACfU and the government combining to denounce the 
union. Following meetings with the A~cru, the allowance was withdrawn and the 
employees paid for lost time. 
Widespread and severe industrial action followed 'the ~Commission's rejection of an 8.3 
percent wage claim 'Which public sector unions had argued under the anomalies principle. 
ACTU inter¥ention brought the resumption of negotiations between unions and 
government and an unprecedented submission to the national wage case seeking to have 
the revised claim fefeflied to the Anomalies Conference. In the ensuing proceedings, 
ACfU involvement was crucial to the decision granting modest wage increases. The 
Commission quoted extensively from the ACfU submission and stressed its reliance on 
ACfU undertakings to oppose affiliates advancing similar claims, unless they met 
stringent tests in ternas of m~erit and ~containment of flow-on (ACAC 1985c, p.l2). 
Without ACfU involvement, the Commission could not have exhibited flexibility in 
reviewing its previous decision, except at the expense of its own credibility and the 
viability of the principles. 
A distinguishing feature of the cases considered above is that, while the important role 
of the A~CTU was acknowledged by other actors, there is little direct evidence of the 
ACTU exhorting unions to comply with the principles,. Revisions of the positions 
adopted by recalcitrant unions is testimony that, in private, the union confederation was 
actively enfolicing the principles. It is relevant also that, since 1983, the ACTU position 
on wages and other issues rela'led to the Accord has invariably reflected a consensus of the 
views of the major unions. Consequently, ther~e was little need for public division or 
exhortation. There were, of course, exhortations in the context of the ACTU Congress, 
but mostly these were designed to convince affiliates of the benefits of the social contract. 
Thus, the President's addresses to the Congress in 1983 and 1985 stressed 'the long te1 na 
benefits of the Accord, listed concessions already gained and warned that, without the 
Accord, the existence of a Labour government would be jeopardised. In 1983, however, 
two senior Executive members made forceful criticisms of the renegade FPU.. As Laurie 
Carnaichael, then also a senior AMWU official scathingly observed: 
Those who have got the idea that the road to socialism is by an individual 
wag~e struggle in half a dozen fa·ctories without mobilising all of the 
work~er,s ., ... , have no bloody idea whatever what it's about (Davis 1983, 
p.513). 
At the 1985 Congress, the emphasis of the wages resolution was on the ~choice between 
the market and a centtalised wage-fixing system allied with the solid benefits arising from 
the Accord (Martin 1985, p.l04). 
After the ,Accord Mark 1 
The wages provisions of the social conttact have twice undergone major revisions and 
on both occasions 'the direction has been similar. Quite simply, the effects of Labour's 
deregulation of the exchange rate and ~capital movements and the appeal of further 
economic deregulation among senior ministers ensured th3't the Accord commiunent to 
real wage maintenance was jettisoned and that a more decentralised wage-fixing system 
was devised. . 
The first shift occurred pursuant to the scheduled re-negotiation of the wages 
provisions of the Accord and endorsement of those changes by the ACTU Congress, in 
September 1985. The major feature of the Accord Marlc 2, as it became known, was the 
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union movement's unPfecedented acceptance of partial wage indexation. On this occasion, 
a discount of up to two percent was ac·cepted by Congress in recognition of the effects of 
the rapid devaluation of the exchange rate and to preserve Austtalia's improv~ed 
international competitiveness. In exchange, the government was committed, among other 
things, to an equivalent reduction in personal income tax, supporting full indexation in 
the current national wage case, ~encouraging the extension of industry and occupation-based 
superannuation and supporting an ACIU claim for a 3 percent productivity-based wage 
claim to be paid in the fotna of increased superannuation. Significantly, there was only 
isolated opposition to this packag~e on the floor of Congress and the resolution was 
adopted unanimously. 
The Accord Mark 2 was not fully considered by the Commission until early 1986 and 
its decision was incorporated into the principles in June 1986. On the issue of 
discounting, the Commission arrived at the same figure pr~eviously agreed to by the 
ACTU and the government (ACAC 1986b, p . 16). Regarding the inter-related issues of 
productivity and superannuation, the Commission's decision is best described as artful; it 
rejected the productivity claim because of its potential adverse effects on profitability, but, 
in view of the widespread incidence of agreements and negotiations on superannuation and 
expectations generated by the Accord Mark 2, it did not rule on superannuation. Instead, 
the Commission attempted to contain labour costs by introducing a principle expressing 
its intention to regulate the order and timing with which agreements were implemented 
and setting an upper limit of a 3 percent wage equivalent increase. There followed a 
campaign orchestrated by the ACfU in which strategically placed affiliates pushed for new 
or improved superannuation benefits. 
The ink was hardly dry on the June national wage decision when employers and the 
government began publicly to press for a more flexible wage-fixing system, one which 
would deliver real wage reductions in the short tenn (Petridis 1987, pp.76-83). By 
December~ this campaign resulted in the Commission fornaally terminating wage 
indexation and adumbrating new principles on which there was an unusual degree of 
unanimity between the ACTU, employers and the government. The Com.mission 
justified its decision as a response to the continuing and severe deterioration in economic 
conditions, especially the tenus of trade and the current account deficit, and the pessimistic 
outlook. Its assessment of the parlous state of t.he economy was ~encapsulated in the 
statement that: "While the direct effect of wage increases on the CPI may have been 
small, .. .it is the highest rate since June 1983" (ACAC 1987, pp.5-6) .. 
Not only did the ACTU accept this assessment of the economy and the importance of 
containing wages growth, it proposed new wage-fixing guidelines, effectively 
relinquishing its longstanding pursuit of wage indexation. Thus, a Special Unions 
Conference, in November 1986, endorsed an ambit ~claim for full wage indexation, but 
with a fall-back position seeking a two-tier system providing for two flat increases in the 
frrst tier and scope for negotiated or arbitrated increases in the second (ACTU 1986). This 
posi·tion was shared substantially by the government and the Confederation of Australian 
Industry, the major employer organisation. The ACTU justified its pragmatism as 
working towards a "centralised wages system that has the potential to sustain living 
standards of all workers, particularly low and middle income ~earners" (ACIU 1986). 
H~ence, it could be argued that the two-tier system was derived from the concept of a needs-
detei .anined basic wage which the Acru had pursued from its inception, in 1927, until the 
early 1960s. Consistent with this and the thrust of the Accord, the resolution also 
stressed the need for the government to "provide for needs through substantially increased 
family allowances". 'This gained concrete expression in a wage-fixing principle providing 
for granting and adjusting supplementary payments in minimum rates awards, subject to 
the second tier ~ceiling. 
The basis of the wage-fiXing principles introduced in March 1987, was to pfovide for 
flexibility within centtally deteranined limits: there would be "detennination in a National 
Wage Case of a maximum lev~el of increase that can be sustained over a period of time 
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having regard to the broad range of industrial, economic and social factors affecting 
Australian society" (ACA~C 1'987, p.8). The cornerstone concepts of collective and 
individual commitment were r~etained. The first tier ~ceiling was set at 1.5 percent over the 
ensuing year and this was to be awarded in two stages: it began w.ith a flat increase of 10 
dollars and, following a prolonged r~eview, a further 6 dollars was awarded in February 
1988. The second tier ceiling was set at 4 percent of ·wages and this was applied to most 
of the existing categories of exceptional increases. 
The most radical featur~e of the two-tier system, and it was here that the union 
movement's cohesion was tested, was in providing for wage increases on the basis of 
specified improvements in efficiency achieved by job restructuring and eliminating 
inefficient management and work practices. Inclusion of the restructuring and efficiency 
principle was designed to encourage plant and enterprise negotiations within the context of 
framework industry agreements. Agreements were to be subject to ratification by the 
Commission and it would arbitrate if negotiations :failed, but in those cases the 
inb'ioduction of increases was to be deferred. Fundamentally, this was a tripartite initiativ~e 
·to entrench collective bargaining within a ~centralised wage-fixing system and thereby to 
accommodate the ascendant deregulatory sentiments. That such a move was palatable to 
the ACTU and the vast majority of its affiliates has to be seen in ·the context of the scope 
in the second tier for wage rises for both lower-paid and strategically located workers and 
the extraordinary economic and political climate. With a federal election scheduled during 
1987, the viability of the wage-fixing system was critical to the reten Lion of a Labour 
Party gov~emment. 
Labour was re-elected in July and yet, by the end of 1987, the second tier had not 
declined into a generalised wage round; few agreements were ratified before July and it has 
been estimated that only 20 percent of employees had obtained increases by December 
(Age 1987, p . 12). As to the authenticity of the concessions, some have been predictably 
bivial but others have been quite major; for example, shortening or eliminating the 
Chrisunas shutdown, staggered br~eaks to ensure work continuity, greater flexibility in 
taking roster~ed days off, multi-skilling, reduced demarcations, rationalisation of job 
classification sbllctures, introduction of twelve-hour shifts and reducing the application of 
penalty payments. 
The significance of the dev~elopments discussed abov·e is that the ACTU jettisoned full 
wage indexation, ostensibly in the short-tetna, and agreed to uphold its replacement for a 
twelve-month period. Remarkably, ·with the exception of the Plumbers and Gasfitters 
Employees Union, most unions accepted the evolving wage-fixing arrangements, despite 
substantial falls in real wages beginning in 1986. 'The pay-off ~or the ACTU and its 
affiliates was preservation of the living standards of the low paid, directly through the 
wage-fixing system and indirectly through the social wage, and scope for increases for 
strategically placed groups of wor~ers, particulaily in manufacturing. 
Other than the PGEU, the A·CTU seems to hav~e been able to contain challenges to the 
wage-fixing system. Their challenge began with a refusal to make a commitment to the 
revised principles, introduced in June 1986, and was followed with a national industrial 
~campaign over a log of ~claims which included a demand for a wage increase of 70 dollars 
per ·week to compensate for income losses caused by departures from full indexation since 
1983. The ~continued application of bans against major building projects and the union's 
refusal to adhere to ACTU policy saw ~employers pursue a range of legal sanctions 
beginning with the insertion of penal clauses in the union's award and culminating in the 
imposition of fines totalling 280,000 dollars pursuant to the provisions of section 45D of 
the Trade Practices Act Finally, in December 1987, with a second ·tier wage increase 
being paid to all other building workers and agreement for a severance pay scheme 
concluded, the PGEU conceded defeat citing the debilitating effects of legal sanctions 
(Austtalian Financial Review 1987, p.3). Doubtless, the apparent capacity of the other 
unions and the ACTU to gain a concession with limited flow-on potential was significant 
too. 
• 
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Having made the transition away from wag~e indexation, there remains the question of 
whether the ACTU can ensure continued union compliance ·with the centralised wage-
fixing system. 
Discussion 
Although the Commission is generally w~ell-suited to the conduct of an inco,mes 
p<)licy, it is deficient in several ways. Because of this, a mechanism was needed to deliver 
union compliance. Th~e ACTU was such a mechanism, however, its co-operation and 
~capacity for enfOfcement cannot be assumed to be absolute and unchanging. 
A major institutional feature facilitating an effective incomes policy is the network of 
federal and stat~e tribunals which, through a combination of law and convention, can 
provide centralised regulation of wages and conditions of employment. Against this are 
several considerations, especially the ~commission's inability to compel state tribunals to 
follow its wage-fixing principles and the fact that since the 1960s the Commission has 
lacked effectiv~e sanctions with which to enforce its decisions. It is this latter 
consideration in particular which has been regarded as a major obstacle to the operation of 
an incomes policy. 
The corollary of lack of effective sanctions has been a view of Australian unions as 
individually powerful organisations able to extract favourable wages settlements from 
employers. This view is flawed in two key respects. It takes insufficient account of the 
institutional dependence of Australian unions on the conciliation and arbitration systems 
from which they derive their registration and the associated benefits. Although some 
unions, such as the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union and the Coal Miners Federation, 
have a longstanding record of militancy usually d~eriving from strong shop-floor 
organisation, the majority have been either reluctant or unable to challenge tribunal 
decisions, except in propitious economic circumstances. 
Allied with this, the role of the ACTU in shaping or constraining these wages 
campaigns is ffequently misunderstood. In effect, the reciprocal of the organisational 
weakness of unions is their susceptibility to co-ordination and even control by the ACTU. 
This is not to suggest that the ACTU's degr~ee of formal control over affiliates is 
equivalent to that enjoyed by some of its European counterparts. Contfol over affiliates 
should not be measured solely in teiins of fo1tual powers and organisational structure. It 
is also important to assess the extent to which the influenoe of a union confederation is 
enhanced by the role which it is given by other institutions and by union affiliates. 
Of particular interest was the adoption of the Accord and the subsequent introduction of 
a modified wage indexation system in 1983. This marked a departure from all previous 
periods of centralised wage-fixing., including the case by case approach adopted by the 
Commission in 1981 and the wages pause of 1982. This was the frrst occasion on which 
the ACTU embraced a centralised system to the point of accepting a role in the 
suppression of over-award bargaining. In the absence of a pervasive economic crisis and 
without the wide-ranging provisions of the A~ccord, it is unlikely that this ~change would 
have occurred 
In the case of the Accord-based incomes policy, the Commission has assigned the 
ACTU a pivotal function in ensuring the compliance of individual affiliates and has 
reinforced this by a willingness to give an especially favourable lieception to arguments 
advanced on 'their behalf by the ACIU. The importance assigned to the ACTU is further 
reinforced by its apparent influence on the federal government as evidenced, for example, 
by its ability to obtain concessions on behalf of the renegade Builders Labourers 
Federation. Thus, until recently, the logic of incomes policy has turned on substituting 
legal sanctions for the subtler pressure able to be exerted on individual unions by an 
ACTU with significant influence at high levels in the state apparatus. Recent 
developments involving the PGEU, but also other unions, indicate that economic 
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conditions and the fear of a conservative ,government may have assigned legal sanctions a 
secondary role in securing union compliance. 
At least equally important to the viability of ~centralised wage-fixing, and the incomes 
policy of which it is a major part, is unions' willingness to cede even partial ~control over 
target wage levels and structures to the A~cru.. In this relation, it is striking 'that the 
traditionally militant Amalgamated Metal Workers has been a cornerstone of union 
support for the Accord and that this has carried over through suc~cessive fe-negotiations of 
its wages provisions and the Commission's revisions of the principles. Thus, at least in 
the short term, Australian unions have foregone their historical attachment to the goal of 
real wage maintenance and obtained in exchange some relief for low-wag~e earners and 
limited scope for decentralised collective negotiations within the context of an incomes 
policy. 
It remains to be seen whether the Australian incomes policy is viable over the long 
te11n, that is, when the sense of economic crisis which has pervaded the operation of the 
wage-fixing principles has passed. What is reasonably ~clear is that the combination of a 
union confederation having strong influence on a social democrat government and 
industrial tribunals capable of centrally fixing wages can ameliorate disputation and lower 
the rate of wages increase over the short to medium term. This model could readily be 
~plied across the Tasman, but so far the prospect of a social ~contract seems to have found 
little favour with either the I .ange government or the unions. 
Ironically, present indications are that the Australian system may develop toward its 
New Zealand ~counterpart. It has become evident that the termination of indexation 
adjustments was not intended to be temporary as originally suggested by the ACTO. 
Rather, this was an interim stage in developing a more market oriented wage-fixing 
system, one designed to facilitate structural adjustments as well as combat inflation. 
Under such a regime it can be expected that individual unions will have an enhanced fole 
in ,wage-fixing, possibly at the expense of 'the A~CIU. 
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